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PRELIMINARY CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES FOR T10 TRANSLUNAR
INJECTION MANEUVER
By Bobbie D. Weber
SUMMARY
j^
This paper presents the procedures to be followed if a contingency
develops during or immediately following the translitnar injection ( TLI )
maneuver. Also presented are sufficient trajectory data to substantiate
the procedures and a discussion of the philosophy which led to the devel-
opment of the procedures,
It will be seen that procedures for aborting following a contingency
during TLI are straightforward and the events leading to an abort maneu-
ver can be timelined and rehearsed preflight.
1
INTRODUCTION
The preliminary contingency procedures presented in this report are
for contingencies that occur either during or immediately after TLI.
These procedures are considered preliminary only because they have not
been tested in simulations by the flight controllers and crew. Descrip-
tions of alternate missions being considered for contingencies occurring
during TLI are not within the scope of this document, but may be found
in reference 1.
Changes to the procedures presented will be given in the minutes to
the meetings of the Apollo Abort Working Group .(AAWG), and the final
procedures will be documented in the operational abort documents for the
particular missions to which the procedures apply.
The noml.nal translunar injection maneuver is a near-Hohmann type
maneuver performed with the S-IVB booster transferring the Apollo 	 j.
spacecraft from a stable near-earth parking orbit to a stable earth-
centered, high-FApogee ellipse which intersects the moon's gravitational
influence. For,
 any given time of S-IVB cutoff during the nominal TLI
or for any of the free-flight trajectories resulting from boost--r cutoffs
due to the violation of 'the suggested attitude deviation and attitude
rate limits presented in reference 2, immediate corrective action will
!%
2not be required (except for rate damping maneuvers). The limits suggested
in reference 2 are more restrictive than any trajectory limits required to
achieve an earth intersecting ellipse, which would be required to produce
trajectory limits such as exce8sive entry loads or insufficient time to
prepare the command module (CM) for entry. Figure 1, which was taken
from. reference 3, shows TLI trajectories resulting from several S-IVB
instrument unit (IU) gyro drifts about the pitch axis. The points at
which the trajectory would be terminated based on the total pitch attitude
.	 deviation limit (159 from nominal are indicated. Please note that for
none of the terminal points does the osculating perigee altitude indicate
an earth intersecting ellipse. Therefore, the contingencies which would
require S-IVB shutdown and immediate corrective action (abort) do not
include 'trajectory limits related to crew safety. Furthermore, any con-
tingency originating within the booster and requiring booster shutdown
would not require the crew to perform any immediate corrective action
except for rate damping maneuvers or possibly an emergency CSM/S-IVB
separation.
The contingency procedures presented herein and the problems with
which this paper is concerned are those possible spacecraft subsystems
problems which can be isolated either immediately during TLI or immedi-
ately following TLI and which could result in catastrophe if immediate
corrective action is not taken. Possibly spacecraft; systems failures
which might cause S-IVB shutdown and an abort to be initiated are given
in table I (ref. 4) .
Detection and verification of a system failure during the brief
duration of the TLI maneuver is quite unlikely. Even if a system failure
is indicated, it is possible that a degradation rather than an outright
failure has occurred or that the instrumentation indicating the failure
is at fault. Therefore, it is advisable, if verification of an indicated
failure cannot be made, the TLI maneuver be continued to the time of
nominal S-IVB cutoff. At that time, the crew can perform the normal
malfunction checks (as will be outlined in the "Apollo Operations Hand-
book" z for the lunar mission) with ground assistance.
In both instances, if the crew detects wild verifies a failure during
TLI severe enough to initiate booster cutoff and an immediate abort
maneuver, or if the crew elects to continue the TLI maneuver to the time
of nominal cutoff and perform an abort maneuver subsequent to the mal-
function checks, the service propulsion subsystem (SPS) will be the primary
propulsion system. Practically, the SPS will be the only propulsion
system in either instance as the severity of the 'situation will preclude
transposition and docking (T&D) with the lunar module (LM) or waiting in
the preabort or,-it until the service module (SM) reaction control sub-
system (RCS) could effect deorbit.
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There exists only one plausible instance when the crew might use
the LM descent propulsion subsystem (DPS) as a backup to the SPS for
aborts from TLI. Should the malfunction checks immediately following
TLI indicate the SPS is inoperable, and some other system has failed
requiring that the crew be returned to earth immediately, the LM DPS
would be requ.i.red to perform the abort maneuver. Although this represents
a multiple-failure situation, it is possible such a contingency could
occur. The procedures required will not be considered herein, as the
procedures for early translunar coast (TLC) will be applicable.
CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES
Preliminary Display Limits and Crew
Monitoring Considerations for TLI
Reference i presents suggested total attitude deviation and attitude
rate limits and associated crew monitoring considerations for TLI. Recent
AAWG meetings have indicated that the propellant moo-oxidizer mixture
ratio (M/R) shift which occurs during TLI may cause the limits suggested
in reference 1 to be exceeded. Action is being taken to determine if
this event (M/R shift) is predictable and to determine to what degree it
would affect the vehicle attitude (ref. 5).
Fixed Attitude Abort Procedures
Should a contingency occur during TLI, such as the systems failures
noted in table I, requiring the S-IVB to be sh> t down and an immediate
return of the crew to earth, the abort maneuver will be performed at a
fixed time from S-IVB cutoff and at a fixed attitude with respect to
the pilot's line of sight (LOS) to the earth's horizon (fig. 2). The
purpose of this maneuver will be to achieve a target near the center of
the entry corridor which will be defined as a function of inertial
velocity (VEI ) and inertial flight-path angle (y EI ) at 400 O00 ft
w
(fig. 3). Landing site control will not be provided by this procedure
since the abort attitude and the time of abort initiation are fixed.
4	 The landing site will be a function of the time of rooster cutoff (fig, 4).
The rationale for using such a procedure 'is that the time from the
abort maneuver to atmospheric entry (TAR) increases rapidly with respect
to the time the maneuver is delayed from booster cutoff. If time were
taken to track the spacecraft, align the IMU, compute an abort solution,
and prepare to execute the abort with the primary guidance navigation
and control subsystem (PGNCS) , TAR would. far exceed the lifetime of the
system which failed and caused the abort to be initiated.
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Figure 2 . - Fasic geometry of a horizon reference abort.
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9One factor which is a prerequisite to this procedure is that the
docking reticle, or crew optical alignment sight (COAS), shown in figure 5,
be mounted on the left forward v_ewing window prior to TLI. The COAS
will be the prime attitude reference source for the fixed attitude abor ;
maneuver. Although it has been noted in reference 6 that the COAS can
be mounted in about 3 minutes, it was agreed in the AAWG meeting that
this time could be used to provide more useful support to the abort
•	 maneuver preparations.
Table II presents the sequence of events J'rom S-IVB cutoff to SPS
ignition for the fixed attitude abort maneuver. Note that table II
indicates the thrust monitor program (P-47) will not be terminated after
S-IVB cutoff. This program is active for two reasons: first, P-47 will
keep track of the changes in the spacecraft state caused by the separation
maneuvering and second, the display and keyboard (D3KY) parameters used
in conjunction with preflight crew charts are the only sources for
solutions to the abort maneuver.
The thrust monitor program will remain active to monitor the accelera-
tion provided by the subsequent abort maneuver. The current procedures
do not require the three components of velocity from P-47 be used to
evaluate the maneuver. This program remains active to track the space-
craft state because the subsequent midcourse and entry will be performed
normally without realigning the IMU or receiving a state vector update.
The abort maneuver will be performed using the automatic stabiliza-
tion_ and control subsystem (SCS) mode in which the thrust vector is held
fixed inertially. At the initiation of the abort maneuver, the crew will
have aligned a marking (to be determined) on the COAS reticle and the
earth's far horizon (horizon west of the subsatellite point). Also,
the crew will be heads-up with respect to the LOS to the horizon. During
the maneuver, the horizon will appear to move across the window as the
spacecraft's center of gravity (c.g.) shifts.
As indicated previously, the only sources which will be available
to the crew to provide solutions for the abort maneuver are the DSKY
parameters in P-47 (inertial velocity, V; altitude, h; and altitude rate,
h) and crew charts prepared preflight. The Real-Time Computer Complex
(RTCC) will not be required to provide solutions for the fixed attitude
abort maneuvers. ;Several charts will be provided the crew preflight.
They will include: (1) "Abort AV as a function, of inertial velocity at
booster cutoff". This chart will provide the AV for the AV monitor as
indicated in table I. I. Solutions which result in land landings will be
indicated on the charts (fig. 6),. (2) "Time from abort to entry as a
function of inertial velocity". Besides providing support data, this
chart will indicate whether or not the crew would be expected to perform
a subsequent midcourse maneuver. A midcourse maneuver will always be
performed with RCS trim if there is sufficient TAR; that is, if TAR >
1.5 hours (fig, 7)„
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TABLE II,- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR THE
FIXED ATTITUDE ABORT MANEUVERS
Time from
booster cutoff,
min:sec
00:00
00:03
01:30a
0+:00
05:00
09:30
09:45
10:00
Event
Terminate S-IVB thrust, SM/RCS +X thrusters on.
Continue CMC in P-47. Select V, h, li display
and record.
CSM/S-IVB separation.
Separation completed, SM/RCS +X thrusters off.
AV monitor set to correct value from charts. Pre-
pa^re for SCS AV auto maneuver.
CMDR pilot in position to view horizon through
COAS. If in contact, the ground will verify the
pitch and yaw gimbal angles and AV in the counter
(from ground charts).
FDAI align
Ullage
SPS ignition
aSeparation maneuvE^rs have not been defined. It is desirable that
	 i
separation maneuvers be completed by this time.
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Figures 6 and 7 are the results of conic solutions to the abort
problem in which the angle between the thrust vector and the LOS to the
horizon is assumed to be 50 (thrust vector below LOS). As indicated in
reference 3, this angle has yet to be finalized based on analyses of
finite thrusting, c.g. offset, and dispersion analysis. Figures 8 and 9
give comparisons of the finite solution (for 50 between the thrust vector
and the LOS to the horizon) and the conic solutions. Further comparisons
are given in reference 7.
For approximately the last third of the TLI burn, it is anticipated
that midcourse maneuvers will be required following the fixed attitude
aborts. References 8, 9, and 10 give a good indication of the expected
midcourse AV requirements.
Table III gives the midcourse and entry guidance modes following
the fixed attitude aborts from TLI. As indicated, if the ground has
voice and command contact with the spacecraft, the midcourse maneuver
will be computed in the RTCC using the RTCC return to earth abort program
(RTEAP) and the CMC entry target line which will be near the center of
the entry corridor shown in figure 3. The pad message sent to the crew
and the procedures for executing the midcourse will be similar to the
message and procedures for the abort at TLI cutoff-plus-90-minutes (to
be discussed).
If the ground could not contact the spacecraft, the crew would per-
form the midcourse using the onboard return-to-earth abort program P-37.
Primary Abort Procedures for TLI
As indicated previously, there are two types of r ,4,. ",functions or
contingencies which could cause an abort to be initiated from the TLI
maneuver. The first would consist of a gross subsystem failure which
could be detected and verified immediately. The second type of failure
is that which could be verified by the crew by performing the standard
malfunction procedures as outlined in the Apollo Operations Handbook.
Also, the results of the malfunction procedures may indicate that the
suspect system is performing satisfactorily but the instrumentation
which indicated the malfunction is at fault. Many , of the malfunction
procedures will require the participation of all crew members and the
procedures may require as long as 30 minutes to perform. Therefore, the
primary procedure following the detected indication of a system malfunction
will be to continue the TLI maneuver to the time of nominal cutoff and
then perform the malfunction procedures. Table IV shows the procedures
that will be performed on both the ground and onboard following booster
cutoff. At booster-cutoff-plus-30-minutes, the crew and ground will
have completed the malfunction procedures and a GO - NO-GO decision for
T&D will be made.. If the malfunction procedures verify that a spacecraft
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TABLE III.- MIDCOURSE AND ENTRY GUIDANCE MODES
FOLLOWING FIXED ATTITUDE ABORTS DURING TLI
i
Commo Midcourse Entry
status
Attitude Maneuver
Voice IMUa Optimum using G&N control with EMS
and RTF.PP/RTC% monitor landing point
CMD update is possible.
GDC/BMAGS Optimum using Backup entry with EMS
u RTEAP/RTCC monitor.
optics
No voice IMJc I	 Optimum using
or RTEAP/onboard I	 G&N control with EMS'
CMD monitor.	 Backup entry
would be constant g
using EMS.
aAssumes platform not tumbled prior to or during fixed attitude
abort maneuver.
bAssumes platform not available for attitude reference.
c I14U must be available for crew to perform the midcourse calcula-
tions , etc. , onboard.
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system has failed and requires the immediate return of the crew to earth,
preparations will begin leading to an abort maneuver at booster-cutoff-
plus-90-minutes (c.o. + 90 abort).. The c.o. + 90 abort will be an in-plane
maneuver to an alternate target point (contingency landing area). The
abort solution will be constrained by requiring the return flight time
from S-IVB cutoff to entry to be less than 18 hours.
It was noted in table I that there existed a readily identifiable
.failure which could require the return of the crew within 18 hours. The
abort AV required to return the crew within this time (from S-IVB cutoff
to entry) is approximately 4200 fps. To provide a procedure which will
return the crew within this time to an alternate target point (ATP) and
reserve sufficient SPS propellant for a subsequent midcourse correction
(MCC), a minimum AV has been established for the aborw' maneuver to insure
entry within 18 hours, and a maximum AV has been established to insure
landing point control to land at an ATP and still reserve propellant for
a. MCC. Upon examining the ATP's for the lunar mission, it was found
that the greatest distance between the ATP's was about 105 0 longitud,,:!.
If the established minimum AV (4200 fps) lands at one ATP and there
exists another ATP 105" longitude to the east, the additional AV re-
quired to achieve the other ATP is that AV required to shorten the re-
turn time by 7 hours. Thus defined, the maximum AV for the TLI-plus-90-
rinute abort is about 6250 fps and the return time is 11 hours. There
does exist one area on the earth -vfhere possible land landings may result
from the TLS-plus-90-minute abort (i.e. the distance between ATP's is
greater than 105° longitude). If an abort using the minimum AV (4200 fps)
results in a landing between latitudes of 15 0
 N to 40' N and longitudes
between 300 W eastward to 1^ 5° L, the maximum AV (5250 fps) cannot achieve
an ATP. Also, the maximum AV available (10 000 fps) in some instances
cannot achieve an ATP. For landings in that area,. AV's less than 4200 fps,
which would result in return times greater than 18 hours, would need to
be employed. Preliminary results indicate landings in that area would
require TLI to occur north of about 25 0
 N in a northeasterly direction.
Studies are currently being conducted to determine the precise TLI con-
_	 ditions required for landings in that area and if any operational planning
coincides with those conditions.
Prior to TLI the ground will have provided the crew with a solution
to the c.o. + 90 abort. The pad message (message sent via voice) for the
c.o. + 90 abort is given in table V.
As noted in table IV, a new abort solution will be sent, following
TLI, updating the pre-TLI pad message. Both solutions as well as the
onboard solution will be targeted to the CMC,entry target line.
f	 ...tit ..XKSb '^ . ^w,w	 ,..'w'	 	^ ^.^, `^' '9•'°^.t.."" '` 	 ^n''s	
>
.v
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TABLE V.- PAD MESSAGE FOR CUTOFF-PLUS-90-MINUTES ABORT
Parameter
	 Description
GETI
	 Ground elapsed time of abort maneuver ignition,
hr:min:sec
AV 	 Change in velocity magnitude, fps
^L	 Latitude of resultant land point, + north
x 	 Longitude of resultant landing point, + east
TFF	 Transit time from GETI to 400 000-ft altitude,
hr:min:sec
VEI	 Inertial velocity at 400 000-1t altitude
YEI
	
Inertial flight-path angle at 400 000-ft altitude
P, Y, R	 INN gimbal angles at SPS ignition attitude
COAS EL	 COAS elevation angle for in-plane horizon at ignition
attitude
Reticle	 Reticle point where in-plane horizon should be aligned
at ignition attitude
21
Upon receipt of the pad message the crew will select the onboard
RTEAP (P-37), perform P-37 using GETI and AV from the pad message, and
compare P-37 output to the remainder of the pad message. This action
will not only genezate the Lambert's targeting parameters for the BPS
thrusting program (P-40) but also provide verification that the PGNCS
is operating properly. If the P-37 results do not agree with the pace
message, the crew can perform a manual attitude maneuver to align the
visual references on the COAS and check the IMU gimbal angles from the
pad message to verify the inertial measu rement unit (IMU) alignment.
If it is finally established that the PGNCS results are unacceptable,
the abort maneuver will be performed in the SCS automode using the AV 
from the pad message for the AV monitor and either the IMU gimbal angles
provided by the ground (if it is verified by the optical check that the
IMU is aligned properly) or the COAS visual references for the BPS ignition
attitude.
Logical Flow Diagrams
Figure 10 presents logical flow diagrams summarizing the contingency
procedures presented in this paper. Although "no-voice" considerations
were not presented on the logical flow diagrams the following assumptions
concerning voice communications were made:
1. No ground-to-air voice communicatuions, ground-to-air telemetry,
or MSF'N track will exi st dia-ri ng TLI to TLI-pliers-1 n-mi nutes:
2. Ground-to-air communications status will not affect the fixed
attitude abort procedures.
3. The only change effected by "no-voice" following TLI would be
that the ground would not be able to update the TLI-plus-90-minute abort.
Other assumptions made affecting the validity of the procedures and the
logical flow diagrams are:
1. The crew will be provided preflight the necessary charts to
support the fixed attitude abort maneuver.
2. In earth parking orbit, the crew will be provided a solution
to the TLI-plus-90-minute abort.
3. The crew will be provided preflight a chart enabling them to
determine the inplane point of th-- earth's horizon for the TL'I-plus-
90-minute abort.
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Figure :0. - Logical flow diagrams for TLI contingency procedures.
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4. Prior to TLI (preflight or in earth parking orbit) the crew will
be provided a time history (charts or digital data) of the nominal TLI
IMU gimbal angles.
5. Prior to TLI the COAS will be mounted and boresighted parallel
to the x-body axis.
6. The thrust monitor program (P-47) will be used to monitor TLI
and the pilot can call V, h, and h displays at his discretion.
7. The CMC will remain in P-47 and "average g" will continue when
an "SPS abort" is initiated during TLI.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Procedures to be followed in the event a contingency occurs during
the translunar injection maneuver have been presented.
The procedures are to be considered preliminary only due to the fact
they have not been tested in flight controller, crew simulation exercises.
Changes to the prescribed procedures will be noted in the minutes of
the Apollo Abort Working Group meetings and the final procedures will be
presented in the operational abort documents of the missions to which the
procedures are applicable.
i
'` C '"`l "`	 ,	 _" ems
. •--	 ',A •x"0,;.« . .-7 7 ^^ ..^^,^+', $„ """ r'^
29
REFERENCES
1. Duncan, Rocky 0.; et .al: Spacecraft Preliminary Abort and Alternate
Mission Studies for AS-504A, Volume I - Alternate Mission Studies.
MSC IN 67-FM-4, January 6, 1967.
2. Hyle, Charles T.: Preliminary Display Limits and Crew Monitoring
Considerations for TLI, LOI, and TEI. MSC IN 67-FM-138,
September 27, 1967.
3. Flight Analysis Branch: Trajectory Deviations Due to IU Drifts About
the Pitch Axis During TLI. MSC memorandu.. 68-FM36-151, March 28,
1968.
4. Assistant Chief, FAB: Results of the Eighteenth Apollo Abort Working
Group (AAWG) Meeting Held October 17, 1967. MSC memorandum
67-FM36-430, October 25, 1967.	 .
5. Flight Analysis Branch: Open Action Items from the Apollo Abort 	 r
Working Group (AAWG) Meetings Pertaining to the LLM. MSC memoran-
dum 68-FM36 -66, February 15, 1968.
6. Chief, Flight Crew Support Divison: Backup Abort Procedures for
Aborts from the Translunar Injection Burn. MSC memorandum
CF243-7M-78, October 19, 1967.
7. Foggatt, Charles E.: Finite and Implusive 3urn Simulations of Fixed
Attitude Translunar Injection Aborts. MSC IN 67 -FM-197, December 20,
1967.
8. Flight Analysis Branch: SPS Midcourse AV Requirements Following
Fixed Attitude Aborts from TLI. MSC memorandum 67-FM36-386,
October 12, 1967.
9. Flight Analysis Branch: Midcourse and Entry Following Fixed Attitude
Aborts from TLI. MSC memorandum 68-FM36-84, February 20, 1968.
t•
10. Pace, Charles W. (MSC Task Monitor); and TRW Systems, Contingency y
Operations Section: Fixed Attitude Abort Procedures for Aborts
^.	
Occurring During Translunar Injection. MSC IN 68-FM-48,
February 15, 1968.
a:
.	 `} ^	 ^	 :	 . ..	 ^, .,	 t ^
	 ...,	 ae,	 ^'^.	 ^ ^.^..'±.	 ;'I^.^y, .:i '^.^-	 a	 lkrA,s. tr ^	 ^	 'a. «• ms's x ,ti '.	 ..*^	 t ^
	 ^^+	 Y+R.+ +and -	 `3c*a s
a YT
	
R
Otrw "7
